Another season, another relegation. As a Norwich fan you have quite a rich supply of relegations to compare this against, it feels more crushing than the 19/20 relegation that saw Norwich described as ‘the best team to ever be bottom of the league’ (admittedly before Project Restart that saw 10 straight defeats and only one goal scored) and general admiration for a team that tried to play inventive football, despite being fundamentally flawed. A relegation based on a seemingly internal stubbornness to conform to how people felt teams battling relegation should play.
This allowed a certain sense of pride despite the relegation and a feeling that the was just the first step and next time things would be better. Project Restart dented this feeling to an extent, with the poor levels on display in those 10 games bringing a feeling that getting promoted again would be impossible.
This of course proved unfounded and Norwich dominated the Championship, racked up 97 points and became ‘the Man City of the Championship’. This success is partially what has made the latest relegation more galling, it is probably the only time Norwich have been promoted and fans have generally held a view that Norwich could actually survive at least one season and not since Norwich brought in van Wolfswinkle, Fer, Redmond, Olsson et al have fans felt such optimism. However, like that season Norwich’s signings have proven underwhelming and the optimism unfounded.
What is perhaps most concerning is that in nearly ever metric (apart from points), Norwich have performed worse in 21/22 than 19/20. With a lower xG per game, higher xGa, less pressing, fewer progressive passes and a lower challenge intensity.
Why so bad?
Michael Bailey’s piece on the Athletic does a very good job at pointing out the big ticket failures. The transfers were the wrong players, although the right positions were highlighted as being problematic. I would argue though that some of the failures of this season were baked in from not being addressed while in the Championship.
Norwich’s defence was seen as the fundamental flaw when relegated in 2020, it was obvious that even when winning the Championship in 18/19, the defence was not Premier League quality and wasn’t even particularly good for a Championship team. It wasn’t addressed in 19/20 and in 20/21 Norwich brought in Ben Gibson and Oliver Skipp in an effort to sure things up.
My view over the years has been that promotions are won off the back of your attack, survival is won by your defence. Over the last 6 seasons the team with the best defence in the Championship (according to xGa) has survived, apart from with 15/16’s cohort where Derby had the best defence but failed in the play-offs). Out of the 18 promotions, Norwich’s defence have been the 16th and 15th worst. (Smith’s Villa being the worst, which is a concern)
The initial view would be that Norwich’s defence had improved, they conceded 21 less goals in 20/21 than the previous promotion and Skipp was a break out success. However, the xGa had actually become slightly worse. The main reason for the dramatic improvement in the reduction of goals probably being Tim Krul’s superb form across the season where he saved Norwich about 9 goals when compared to their xG alone (9 is a huge number for this metric by the way, it is probably one of the highest ever figures for a keeper in the Championship). When looking at the rolling average for the xGa for the Championship campaigns under Farke, the trendline across the three seasons remains almost entirely flat. While the actual number of goals conceded remains similar to the xGa in the first two Championship campaigns, it falls below for almost the entire 20/21 season.
Bad Transfers
I think it is fairly clear that the players Norwich brought in over the summer did not improve the team. Especially when factoring in the departure of Oliver Skipp and Emi Buendia. On paper there is good justification for each and of the signings. They all came with good reputations and all, apart from maybe Lees-Melou, with significant potential to improve as players and increase in value for Norwich. However, they all came with a large element of risk, I wrote about each of the signings as they came in over the summer, and with all of them came a warning that they would need to either adapt quickly to the Premier League and need to improve in certain areas of their game.
Unfortunately for Norwich, too few of them made the adaption or the improvements needed. I’d say each player has had moments to show they are capable and why Norwich identified them, but these have been fleeting glimpses and rarely at the same time as each other, minimising their impacts.
However, as bad the signings have been for this season, with 4 on loan Norwich are not burdened with their wages next season and the rest (apart from Lees-Melou again) have time on their side to develop. Not one of the signings has been as bad as the signing of someone like Naismith, who not only had a hefty price tag and wages, but was also almost impossible for Norwich to move on without taking a massive hit. Should Norwich wish to sell Rasicha, Sargent, PLM or Tzolis there is likely to be a good level of interest from clubs in Germany, France or Greece for these players based on previous exploits and reputations. These are full international after all and while Norwich would have to take a fee lower than they paid, you wouldn’t imagine any of them going for less than half they were signed for.
The biggest mistakes of the summer window probably wasn’t the individual deals or players, it was more there were flaws in the overall strategy. It was clear that losing Emi and Skipp were major blows. Rashica coming in for Emi was not a similar type of player but it did add pace and directness that could have been fruitful. By opting to try and replace Skipp with the collection of PLM, Gilmour and Normann it seems Norwich missed the fundamentals of Skipp’s game.
PLM has the energy and ability to cover the pitch like Skipp, but as a self described ‘attacking midfielder’ he was never going to hold the line; Gilmour’s passing range is superior to the conservative, but highly reliable, Skipp’s but he lacks that physicality, and Normann has the same bite, but is also prone to sloppiness in possession and position. Since Norwich signed Tettey in 2012 they have struggled to bring in a defensive midfielder of good enough quality on a permanent deal, they will need to try again to fill that role in 2022.
The aforementioned Micheal Bailey piece also covers well the sense that reducing the number of new players and targeting fewer, more expensive players is the approach the club now wish they took. With hindsight that is what many who observe the club would now strongly agree with. I can see why the club wanted more depth in each position last summer, Farke did have a habit of injuring players (although ironically he kept the squad very injury free for the beginning of the season). Had Norwich not added depth and seen the number of injuries suffered in 19/20 again, then they would have been accused of failing to learn from the past.
It seems that for the first time, there may have been a disconnect from Webber and Farke in the desired strategy and players. The result was a confused mixture of what Farke wanted and what Webber felt was needed. Looking back it does feel like Kieran Scott taking on a role at Middlesbrough during the summer may have had a greater impact that it first appeared.
Bad Luck
Luck plays a large role in every season, especially if the odds are already against you. Norwich were dealt with a few terrible pieces of luck before the season had already began. Firstly, a truly awful collection of fixtures at the beginning of the season meant that carrying over momentum from the previous one was going to be incredibly difficult. Getting that first win and first few points under the belt is so important for a promoted team, so Norwich were always off to a rocky start. The second piece of fate that dealt a larger blow to the season was the Covid outbreak in pre-season.
I feel that many will underestimate or underplay the importance of a good pre-season. Giving players the time to build fitness and match sharpness in a low pressure environment is crucial, having to do that in league games against Liverpool, Man City, Leicester and Arsenal is brutal. Add in Norwich trying to integrate a host of new signings and seemingly a new style and system meant the impacts of losing nearly all the pre-season friendlies was multiplied.
There is also the usual bad luck of important players getting injured at important times. Losing Rashica when he was just finding his feet; Idah’s season ending when he was a huge part of back to back wins. These are unfortunate, although shouldn’t be considered season defining.
The Future
Stuart Webber
As with any relegation, there are a lot of questions about what comes next. Cries of a ‘rebuild’ and pessimism are always prevalent at these times. The first and probably biggest decision is around the future of the Sporting Director, even without his new found passion away from football, there would have been question marks over his future at the club, signs that he isn’t fully committed amplify this.
In my mind, Webber has done enough to show that he is still a good person to have around and lead the direction of Norwich. The work he has done in achieving two promotions, while also completely renovating Colney is frankly remarkable (remember the previous CEO basically said Norwich had to choose to be competitive or improve the training ground, Webber has proven that is not the case). The real fruits of academy improvements may still be years away so Webber’s true impact there is still unknown for now, although there does seem to be a promising crop of U23 and U18s right now.
Recruitment, and the success and failings that come with it, are the most public aspect of Webber’s job, although the actual extent of his involvement is unclear. From the outside it is hard to know how the decision on the recruitment were delegated out, did Scott leaving mean more was driven by Farke? Was it clear who was leading on recruitment, or did things fall between the gaps a bit?
However, the cracks between supporters and the leadership at the club are growing wider and wider. It may be too late for these to be fixed, even if a successful season in the Championship follows. Once these divides begin it can be hard to ever really resolve them. David McNally was in a similar position to Webber, a good track record but an increasingly difficult relationship with the fans meant his position was untenable. However, without an Ed Balls figure currently at Norwich, who would be the one to push the Sporting Director out of the door? Also, more importantly, who would be his replacement? It is no good kicking out Webber unless there is a genuine belief someone better can be brought in.
The Board
As with any poor season from Norwich, the lack of investment from the owners/board is highlighted. Norwich’s model certainly makes life harder, but it should not be seen as a complete blocker to success, it just means the money available has to to be spent more wisely. My biggest worry about the board, is the lack of outside voices and independent directors. Who is the person currently challenging whether Webber should be sacked, and if he was to be sacked, who would lead on bringing in his replacement? While I don’t think having someone like Ed Balls back in place would have made much difference to the nuts and bolts of recruitment/coaching, it would be more reassuring that there is someone in place to make tough calls and push for change. (Which something Balls has largely been credited for doing in his stint as chairman). Hopefully this summer sees someone brought in to at least act as Chairperson and provide a bit more oversight at the highest level.
As for whether Delia and MWJ should sell up? Without knowing who if anyone wants the club I find it hard to really talk about. The most likely buyer for a Norwich sized club would be an American hedge fund who use a leveraged purchase like we’ve seen at Burnley. However bad things may seem with Delia, having an owner purely looking to make a profit out of Norwich is not something I ever wish to see.
Dean Smith
As the season has rumbled towards its sorry conclusion, more and more questions have been asked of Dean Smith. At first there was an acceptance that ‘this isn’t his squad’ and ‘no-one could save Norwich’ but regular defeats have called into question what Smith has actually done and it is hard to say whether he has improved on what Farke could offer. There was an initial burst with Smith winning his first game and some positive performances, but this soon fizzled out and Smith’s approach has looked increasingly erratic and unclear.
For a club that prided itself under Farke for having a philosophy, under Smith it has seemed completely devoid of one. Ask most Norwich fans about how Smith wants his team to play football and it would be hard to get a clear answer. Norwich don’t press high, they don’t try to dominate possession, they don’t really set-up to counter attack, or even play direct balls. There is though a caveat to this, every-time Smith seemed to hit on a plan that looked like it might work something happened to make that unworkable. The most noticeable being the 4–2–4 that brought wins against Everton and Watford with Idah and Pukki forming a good partnership. This was soon scuppered by Idah picking up a season ending injury.
What is perhaps more worrying though is Smith’s track record — something that often gets touted as being in his favour. As mentioned earlier his Villa side was promoted with the highest xGa of any team in the last 5 years. He was then given a huge budget in the Premier League and managed survival by the skin of his teeth and a failure of goal line technology. In that Premier League season, Aston Villa had the highest xGa in Premier League — exceeding even Farke’s Norwich. There were also concerns about his ability to organise a defence while he was at Brentford. In an interview with Ted Knutson, the Head of Analytics at Brentford when Smith was manager, he stated that;
“One of our concerns about Dean’s group was they weren’t particularly good defending. As you can see, Brentford got up off the back of their great defence.”
From the rolling xGa it is possible to see that after an initial difficult start Frank managed to significantly improve Brentford’s defence and bring them down to conceding an xGa of less than 1 per game in both 2019/20 and 20/21. It will never be known if Smith could have achieved this as well with the same squad, and he was showing improvements at the end of 17/18, beginning of 18/19.
What is good about Smith though is his apparent openness to bring in others to help rather than being closed off to input from others. The arrival of Craig Shakespeare during the pandemic saw Aston Villa dramatically improve their defence and their xGa for the 20/21 season was over 10 goals better than the previous season. Hopefully, together Smith and Shakespeare can also bring a solid improvement to Norwich’s defence.
What needs to change?
So next season, Norwich go into a Championship and will instantly be one of the richest clubs. Even with needing to reduce costs post relegation having greater spending power than half the league combined. Out of roughly 200 permanent transfers in the Championship only 25 were for a fee of £1m or over. The impact of Covid, FFP and parachute payments have given teams recently relegated a huge advantage in the Championship as the overall quality has reduced over recent years. It also means the gap between the Championship and Premier League is growing steadily wider. Norwich certainly aren’t alone in finding the transition between leagues challenging.
While this sounds like ridiculous arrogance and is tempting all kinds of fate, Norwich’s primary focus next season shouldn’t be building a team to get promoted, but one that can survive in the Premier League. This is the approach Brentford took while in the Championship, they were confident in they could get the club in a position to get up, but they wanted to make sure they were then in the best place to stay up. Recruitment of players and coaches looked at the ultimate goal rather than just focusing on the immediate one. By focusing on being defensively sound and maximising set-pieces, this would give them the best chance of survival in the future. This season with 3 goals from set-pieces Norwich have the lowest total in the league and is 12 fewer Brentford.
Passive play
Something I’d also like to see Norwich address is the element of passiveness to their defence. Farke’s preferred style was a fairly low block, with some high pressing in very specific situations. Emi was often the most active high presser, and he was able to create chances by stealing the ball high up the pitch, when he left this also seems to be something that wasn’t replaced. It’s not that Norwich aren’t a hard working team, only Leeds and Everton made more ‘pressures’ this season. But Norwich tend to do most of this work in their own half, and have one of the lowest figures for pressures in the attacking 3rd with only 20% coming high up the pitch, only Wolves had a lower proportion of pressures in the attacking third. Also, while Norwich were industrious, they weren’t effective. They have the lowest pressure success rate (a successful pressure is where the ball is won within 5 seconds of the pressure) in the league, only forcing a turnover of possession 1 in 4 times. This suggests a fairly unorganised and disjointed application of pressure on their opponents, with it being too easy to avoid or bypass.
Klopp’s assistant Pep Lijnders talks about the difference in ‘pressing’ to ‘chasing’. Pressing is where you apply pressure to the man on the ball, but just to force them back or hurry a pass, while ‘chasing’ is where you aggressively close the man with the ball down, in the express interest of stealing the ball and starting an attack. Norwich ‘press’, but they certainly don’t ‘chase’. This can be seen by the passes per defensive action, the amount of times Norwich allow the opposing team to pass the ball before attempting a tackle, interception or even fouling the opponent. Norwich were too happy to allow their opponents to have uncontested possession and while allowing an opponent time in the Championship isn’t always punished, in the Premier League teams are too good to give them the time to build attacks.
While a high press isn’t a definite route to success, Leeds have struggled this season even with an aggressive approach, it can help a team like Norwich that will often suffer in a deficit of quality on the pitch compared to Premier League opponents.
Rebuild
It is still too early to really know how the squad will look at the beginning of next season, or more importantly at the end of the transfer window. The changed work permit rules means Norwich’s transfer business will have to look very different from their previous stints in the Championship. Players signed based on EU nationality alone are not viable now, and pretty much anyone from the tried and tested 2. Bundesliga is going to be unavailable, unless they are also an international player. Signings such as Stiepermann, Sorenson, Hernandez are now not possible and any player that is eligible for a work permit becomes much more appealing to numerous English clubs, adding a premium to transfer fees and wages. Also, the avenues that the new work permit rules have opened up, especially South America, is probably harder to take advantage of for a Championship club rather than one with the pull of the Premier League. Pre-pandemic Norwich seemed to be ramping up its scouting network in South America, but this was stopped as travel to carry out scouting became impossible.
Kieran Scott’s replacement Lee Dunn goes into his first summer transfer window as a Head of Recruitment with Norwich’s transfers under the highest level of scrutiny in recent history. While Webber has ultimate responsibility, most of the work is carried out by Dunn and his team and the pressure will be on them to produce the goods this summer. Due to previous successes fans have often been open to brining in relatively obscure players on small fees, such openness will be tested this summer as a high level of scepticism will likely greet each signing.
The key signings though will be in the midfield, with Norwich still needing to replace Skipp and Buendia a year on from their departures. Whether Norwich go for a transfer window similar to 18/19 when Pukki, Buendia and Krul were signed to significantly strengthen the first XI, or a similar approach to 20/21 where most the additions were to bulk out the squad while largely relying on the existing players to deliver promotion.
With a short summer break and a condensed season due to the World Cup, it won’t be a regular Championship season. How teams adapt to the changed schedule could have a big impact on the final league positions and trying to develop a playing style with two games a week and little time for training will be especially hard. Little is certain in football, but with Norwich, you know whatever happens, it won’t be dull.
